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1.  Introduction: The puzzle of Italian economic growth 
To historians and economists Italy’s modern economic growth always 
appears as a sort of a puzzle, whose solution cannot be searched for in the   
pattern of change followed by  the greater part of other industrialized countries 
such as, for instance, Great Britain, the U.S., Germany or Belgium. With respect 
to these, the clear differences exhibited by Italian growth firmly convinced   
historians to emphasize its elements of weakness and backwardness rather than  
those of originality and strength.  
To figure out these structural differences – essentially structural wants – I 
recently suggested a paradoxical representation of Italian economic growth: that is 
a process of industrialization and growth without technology, without industry, 
without energy
1. With ‘without’ I do not mean of course an absolute lack, rather a 
relative shortage of those components – big industry, frontier technology, rich 
supply of primary energy – which represented as many  elements of strength of 
modern economic growth 
And yet, Italy  not only industrialized, but also became the sixth industrial 
power in the world. In my opinion this apparent paradox can be explained only 
by a thoughtful long-term analysis of the economic change of the peninsula
2. 
Those weaknesses in fact could be at least partly compensated by: i) a centuries-
old craft and commercial tradition, which stimulated the rooting of a diffused 
entrepreneurial spirit all over the central and northern parts of the peninsula; ii) 
the post-unification (1861) growth of direct state activity to surrogate, partly at 
least, the  scarce finance as well as the feeble capitalistic  bent of entrepreneurs 
(i.e. to grow out of the family threshold and to grow according to the market 
rule)
3.  
Besides,  a closer look at those elements of weakness can transform them, 
at times, in as many trumps: a plethora of small and medium size firms acting all 
over the country, but also able to gain market niches abroad; a diffused capacity 
to import technology and to adapt it to the internal productive necessities; and, 
finally, the efficient use of  primary energies (most of all, water) as a substitute for 
the elsewhere dominant source, coal. 
In this picture energy and State-intervention are the two keywords relevant to 
our issue. In the following pages the association between the two will be analyzed 
in a long-term perspective.  
In  the next paragraph some general issues concerning  the impact of scarce 
energy sources on the economic growth of the country will be sketched; the third 
section will offer a few general remarks on the evolution of  Italian public 
enterprise; the fourth will investigate the origins and development of an Italian 
national oil company; the fifth will examine the most intensive years of growth 
                                                  
1 Toninelli 2001, 2003 
2 Toninelli, 2003, pp. 185-8 
3 Leff, 1979 
  2and transformation of the company into a powerful state-holding, ENI, that is 
period dominated by  the personality of Enrico Mattei. The sixth and the seventh 
paragraphs will follow the destiny of the holding, after Mattei’s death, throughout 
the oil shocks. Few words of conclusion will close the paper . 
 
 
2. Energy supply and Italian economic growth: the framework 
A good starting point is the following question: “how scarcity of row 
materials, and particularly of primary energy sources, affected Italian economic 
growth?”  
Since the unification of the country the question has been debated both by 
contemporary observers and historians. The pessimistic view has been prevailing: 
it underlines mostly the negative effects induced by scarce endogenous energy 
supply – especially coal – in the critical period of the turn of the 19
th century. For 
instance , it has been recently observed
4 that coal saving (as well as capital saving 
and labor intensive) techniques forced Italy into a path toward industrialization 
very different from the English one, based on coal, the general purpose 
technology of the time, where the frontier innovation was concentrated; this, in 
turn, constrained industrialization into a strongly dualistic model, with a few 
modern industrial concerns on the one hand and an excessive number of small 
and medium size firms on the other; in the following period, when new primary 
sources (hydroelectricity and hydrocarbons) became feasible, the economy was 
already locked  into a growth model characterized by  strong dualistic features and 
weak technical innovation.  
On the contrary, in the more optimistic perspective, emphasis has been 
put, first, on the efficacy of alternative primary energy sources (hydroelectricity 
and natural gas), in which the country gained an early technological leadership
5, 
and, second, on the originality of the Italian model of industrialization, which, as 
said, was characterized  by small low energy-consuming units
6. 
    Without getting deeper into the debate, we can stick to a few stylized 
general considerations, suggested by the following graphs and figures, which give 







G.1 Energy intensities of GDP, selected countries,1850-1990 (tep/1980 dollars x1000) 
                                                  
4 Bardini, 1991 and 1998 
5 Colombo, 1991 
6 Cafagna 1989,1999; Colli 1999, 2002;  Toninelli 1999; Bolchini 2003; Berta 2003. 
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Source: Martin, 1990 
 
The first graph portraits the behavior of the curves of the energy intensity 
(EI) in the six Western most industrialized countries: the one of Italy emphasizes 
once more the diversity of its pattern of industrialization. In fact, Italy’s EI curve 
keeps the typical bell-shape – i.e. a moderate process of convergence towards the 
patterns of the other five countries –  but also shows: 
i.  the lowest values all over the period, i.e. the process of economic growth 
with the lowest consumption of energy; 
ii.  no evident breaks, but continuity of growth at slow pace; 
iii.  a moderate but clear increase in the Fifties, that is at the time of the 
economic miracle of the country; 
iv.  a very much delayed phase of industrial maturity which partly explains why 
Italian peak had been so low: such a delay could have favored the adoption 
of the recent and more efficient technologies
7. 
Further considerations are suggested by the observation of the two following 
figures. The first one is concerned with the level of the country’s energy 
dependence from abroad over the past one hundred fifty years
8. 
 
                                                  
7 A recent and thorough discussion  of the behaviour of the energy intensity in the different industrial 
sectors in post -WW2 Italy is offered by Cardinale and Verdelli, 2008 
8 See table 1 in the Appendix 

































  Source: see Appendix, table 2 
 
In spite of its low EI growth, since the industrial wave  of 1880s Italy 
heavily depended from abroad for her energy supply.  Only between 1920s and 
1950s this dependence was reduced to a little more than 50% (1930) of the total, 
thanks to the contribution of water to the production of electricity. These four 
decades comprise: 
- the fascist period (1923-1943), when in a general climate of nationalistic spirit the 
myth of the energetic independence of the country was easily used  by the regime 
for political propaganda.  
- the Mattei’s age  (1946-1963) when a more plausible agenda – energetic autonomy 
rather than independence – was pursued with fairly good results. 
If we turn to the following figure (fig.2) we can see that only in the latter 
period the hydrocarbons-dominated phase of Italian energetic history de-facto 
began.  In fact, their consumption grew from 24% of total energy consumption in 
1950 to 55% in 1960, to 81.5% in 1970 and reached  the peak of 85.5 of 1973, 
then stabilized around 80%. Besides, the contribution of crude alone to total 
energy consumption grew from 22% in 1950 to the peak of 75.3% in 1973, then 
decreased to 56.6% in 1990, while natural gas increased from 10.2% (’73) to 24% 
(’90) (see Appendix, table 2). 
From table 3 in the Appendix it can be grasp that in the past the 
contribution of water to the production of electricity had been actually very 
important. It peaked to 97% in 1930, kept over 80% up to the early  1960s, then 
rapidly decreased,  to drop to 16% in 1990, when 63% came from hydro-carbons 
(coal 17%). The choice to move from water to oil  was determined by: a) the 
almost next exhaustion of the water potentialities within the country and b) the 
collapse of the cost per unit of thermo-produced energy, due to a vintage of new 
thermo-plants of great scale and higher efficiency as well as the drop of the real 
price of crude. 
 
  5 
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3 – State-owned enterprise in Italy: a few general remarks 
  Before entering the specific issue of the role played by national oil 
companies in Italy’s economic growth, a few general remarks concerning the pace 
and pattern of direct state intervention in the economy are needed
9: 
i) direct state-intervention in the economy began soon after  the unification of the 
country and was directed primarily to the construction and management of 
infrastructures such as canals and railroads; 
ii) it increased after WW1 with the setting of financial institutions (the so called 
Istituti Beneduce) to strengthen the financial market, and later of AGIP (1926); 
iii) in the 1930s a new wave of nationalization occurred, aimed  to rescue private 
industrial concerns struck by the economic depression. Two state agencies, IMI 
and IRI, were on purpose created 
iv) in the post world war II period, Italy, unlike the other defeated powers, not 
only resisted pressure to progressively divest public properties and encourage a 
free market ideology, but also gradually enlarged its control over the economy and 
production through what in short was to become an organized shareholding 
system. The system reached its peak in the 1980s: ENI and IRI were its pillars; 
v) only in the mid-1990s, a quite delayed, still ongoing, privatization process 
began, which greatly reduced the State presence in the Italian economy.  
  6
                                                  
9 For a general treatment of the entire parabola of Italian public enterprise, see Toninelli 2003, ch.4, and 
2004  The main social/economic objectives of  the construction of  the Italian 
public sector were partly in line with the ones displayed by other nationalization 
processes
10. They were aimed, first, to  surrogate the inadequate action of private 
capitalism, too feeble on the financial front and facing a very poor market and, 
second, to develop strategic sectors of the economy by initiating public activities 
(oil, highways, telecommunications). But in the Italian case further objectives 
were as important: 
to rescue private business affected by deep, sometimes irreversible economic 
crisis (such as the shipbuilding sector  or various textile, mining and engineering 
companies) as well as to foster modernization and growth (specially employment) 
in neglected regions of the country (most of all in the South and the Islands). 
On the whole, political and ideological motives were apparently less important 
in the Italian case, although a) the component of international prestige and 
political support to the regime was not negligible in the establishment of AGIP, b) 
in the tardy nationalization of electrical sector (ENEL, 1963), political and 
ideological reasons seemed to prevail. 
Up to the creation of ENI (1953), the strategy of AGIP was focused 
particularly on : energetic independence (with Mussolini) and energetic autonomy 
(with Mattei). Only in the Fifties the issue of the relationship between State 
companies and economic growth was clearly posed. IRI and, even more, ENI 
became primary agents of Italy’s economic policy and growth as the statutes of 
both the holdings contemplated social as well as economic goals.  
As a consequence both groups undertook initiatives to relieve unemployment 
(often by acquiring troubled enterprises across various industries) and stimulate 
growth (South Italy). Maximizing profit was at times second to other goals, giving 
rise to “improper financial burdens” in the balance sheet, which were to be  offset 
by special State endowment funds. Later, however, this greatly contributed to the 
explosion of the public debt as well as to the degeneration of the system, all the 
more so since electoral and political goals began to replace the social-economic 
ones. The trend became more evident when a Center-Left government coalition 
introduced new political parties and lobbies (i.e. new interests) into the 
administration of  state-companies
11.  
 
4. The origins and the early development of an Italian national oil company 
4.1 -  In the early Twenties the Italian oil market was controlled by the 
duopoly SIAP (owned by Standard Oil) and NAFTA (Shell). Both companies 
pursued primarily  the downstream activities, although SIAP, thanks to the 
acquisition of a small, old exploring company (Spi), soon became the main 
producer of Italian crude
12.  
                                                  
10  Toninelli 2000 and 2004. 
11 Cuzzi, 1975; Pressenda, Sarale, 1978; Orsenigo, Sapelli, Toninelli 1992; Balconi, Orsenigo, Toninelli 
1995; Barca, Trento 1997; Amatori, Colli 1999. 
12 Pozzi 2001 
  7In 1926, after the unsuccessful joint venture with an American oil company 
(Sinclair), the fascist government  decided to set up a brand-new state oil 
company, AGIP (Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli), with the tasks of exploring 
and supplying hydrocarbons as well as distributing oil products in Italy
13. This 
major decision was somehow paradigmatic of the  ambiguous and fluctuating 
economic policy of the regime: pursuing the national economic interest without 
hurting the private industrial establishment, from which the regime was receiving 
strong political support. Therefore in the board industrial and financial tycoons 
seated together with fascist (often retired) bureaucrats
14.  
The setting up of AGIP was to be explained primarily by the economic-
political climate of the period, imbued  with strong nationalism. In a few 
backward countries rich in oil (such as Mexico and Persia) or in more developed 
countries without crude (Spain, France and precisely Italy), nationalism affected 
directly the oil sector, to face the growing power of the majors,: therefore state 
intervention  either in the upstream or in the downstream activities, or in both,  
became a feature common to all these experiences– although in different forms
15. 
In Italy oil nationalism was just one aspect of  the post-war energy nationalism 
which attracted large sections of the scientific and technical world, the ones 
looking for alternatives to the energy dependence from abroad: such an attitude 
was sharpened by the autarky goals of the late Thirties
16.  In this climate AGIP was 
envisaged as a way to break the existing duopoly, as well as one of the  main tools 
to reach  the energy self-sufficiency. However it has been stressed  also the 
strategic-diplomatic aspect of the decision, that is the possible use of AGIP as a 
mean to penetrate the Balkans: as a matter of fact soon exploration was started in 
Romania through an associated local company, Prahova.
17. 
4.2 – Early development  of  AGIP was hindered by the will of the board not 
to collide with the majors, as shown, first, by the 1932 removal of president   
Alfredo Giarratana, who during his three years office had impressed quite a 
dynamic spur to the company both at home and abroad, and, second, by the 1936 
sale to the Irak Petroleum Co. of  the AGIP’s 40% share of the Mossul Oil Field 
Co., which controlled very rich oil concessions in Iraq
18. 
However, the Thirties marked also a period of  accumulation of intangible 
assets particularly in the upstream. A group of brilliant technicians grew up in 
AGIP, partly as a consequence of the strict collaboration with American geo-
                                                  
13 Magini 1976; Cianci 1977; Pizzigallo 1981; Pizzigallo 1984. For many aspects such a move can be 
considered the actual birth of the state-entrepreneur in Italy 
14 A common joke of the time was  to read the acronym  of AGIP as “Associazione gerarchi in 
pensione”  (Association for retired fascist bureaucrats).  
15 Clark 1990, Sapelli et al. 1993 
16 Petri 1987; Pizzigallo 1993; Toninelli 1999; Maiocchi 2003 
17 Pizzigallo 1984 
18 Magini 1976, pp. 52-3; Pizzigallo 1984, ch. 6-7 
  8physicists: they would have formed the structure of technicians, which Mattei 
could later rely on
19. 
Negligible results in the upstream activities at home – exploration in the Po 
Valley turned out disappointing -  were partly compensated by  success in the 
downstream ones. In 1940 the refining capacity of the company amounted to 
500.000 tons, that is it came to control about 30% of Italian capacity . It was the 
consequence of the incorporation of ROMSA (1927), soon equipped with 
modern cracking technologies, of the refining and cracking plants of Porto 
Marghera (DICSA, 1935) – previously owned by Giovanni Volpi, an outstanding 
industrialist and politician of the regime -  and, finally,  of the 1936 setting up of 
Anic (jointly  with Montedison). Good results were obtained also in the 
distribution, thanks to an aggressive commercial policy (but also to  the state aid): 
the internal market share of AGIP increased from 20% (in 1928) to 33% in the 
mid-Thirties
20. 
4.3 - During the early ‘40s exploration  with innovative techniques  revealed 
some oil and gas fields in the Po Valley: the envisaged potentialities of methane 
fields – especially during  the autarky and war periods – led the State to the 
creation of ENM (Ente Nazionale Metano), to supervise the natural gas activities. 
This in turn, together with AGIP, created SNAM (Società Nazionale   
Metanodotti), a company dedicated to the construction and management of 
pipelines. With regard to downstream, since at the beginning of the war the   
branches of foreign companies had been confiscated and given to the national 
company, AGIP became in practice the sole supplier of the Italian market
21. 
After 1943 Italy’s surrender, the company necessarily split, following the 
political division of Italy:  Rome headquarters, managing mostly downstream 
activities,  were put under the control of CIP (Comitato Italiano Petroli), created 
by the Allies. On the contrary the “old” AGIP kept on acting under the renewed 
fascist regime of Northern Italy (Salò): its new headquarters were set in Milan, 
where at the time former upstream activities and technical capabilities 
concentrated. This split would have marked the following history of the company: 
a creeping cultural and power conflict between “merchant” Rome, supporting 
downstream, and “pioneer” Milan devoted to exploration
22. 
4.4 -The war left AGIP in bad conditions: its refining plants and bunkers 
were damaged or destroyed, the distribution network partly out of service,  oil-
wells dismantled
23. The problem of the internal organization were even heavier: 
with the reunification of the company, problems of day-to-day management, 
communication, accountancy emerged. But, most important,  the destiny of AGIP 
was not clear. It was the object of a sharp conflict, both internal and external to 
                                                  
19 Pozzi 2005 
20 Sapelli et al., 1993, p. 46-7 
21 Magini 1976, pp.75-7 
22 Balconi, Orsenigo, Toninelli 1995, p. 327. 
23 Kovacs  1964, p. 136; Magini 1976, p. 62-3. 
  9the company: on the one side, the ones, backed by the Allies and the 
Confindustria,  who wanted either to have it liquidated, or privatized  or ‘halved’, 
so not to menace the majors’ power; on the other, those who wanted to 




5. The Mattei age: the ‘heroic’ years, 1945-62 
5.1 – On April 1945 Enrico Mattei, a chemical manufacturer and former 
commander-in-chief of the Catholic partisan brigades, was appointed by CLN 
(the National Liberation Committee) ‘extraordinary commissioner of AGIP’:  his 
special task was to manage the activities located in the North,  which had 
remained under the fascist control until the end of the war. 
Mattei had a strong personality and a strong nationalistic spirit: he has been 
called  the “condottiere”
25, to mean that he was a sort of a legend for his 
supporters, his staff and employees, by him always highly motivated to pursue the 
mission of the company. However it is also well known that his figure was much 
criticized, sometimes very harshly, by his opponents, who considered him a 
corrupter and someone who pursued his ends by unscrupulous means as well as 
the first responsible of the bribery system which soon would have afflicted Italian 
politics
26.  
Having soon realized the growth potentialities of AGIP, Mattei became the 
first advocator of its development and fought a sharp political and lobbying battle 
to maintain autonomy, to carry on with exploration, and, eventually, to grow. He 
could rely on the support of its staff and the DC party  - he was elected deputy in 
1948 - and on its own ability to communicate and deal. As a matter of fact  it is 
true that to realize his project Mattei didn’t mind to act at times in cynical or 
opportunistic ways, such as in the case of the 1949 bluff of oil discovery in the Po 
Valley to attract the public opinion
27. Although poor in crude, the Valley turned 
out very rich in methane. Soon AGIP began to supply gas to industries of the 
North-West through plants and pipelines built and managed by SNAM, by now 
fully controlled by AGIP. 
5.2 -  In 1953, in order to rationalize the impetuous growth of the public 
sector of energy, all the state companies operating in the oil field were put under 
the authority of a new state holding: ENI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi). The 
project had been warmly sponsored by Mattei, who became the first president of 
the company. ENI’s  purpose was twofold. At a general level ENI was thought of  
as an agency  for the economic development  of the country, therefore it was 
assigned functions, responsibilities and aims  that went beyond the sheer 
                                                  
24  Sapelli et al  1993, pp 49-51 
25 Yergin 1991 
26 Shonfield 1965, 1974; Frenkel 1966; Cuzzi 1975; Colitti 1979; ENI 1982; Bazzoli, Renzi 1984; Sapelli 
et al. 1993; Perrone 2001. The press campaigns against Mattei  have been collected in ENI 1956-63. 
27 Bazzoli, Renzi 1984, p.112 ff.; Perrone 2001, pp. 33-37, Pozzi 2003, pp. 67 and ff. 
  10economic activity . In other words,  ENI's  staying and competing on the market  
had to coexist with concern for employment, welfare, and  socio-economic 
development, particularly in the southern regions of the country. In this respect 
the Eni  project quite differed from the IRI’s one, previously created (1933) with 
the aim of rescuing  collapsing private enterprises; "social"  objectives entered the 
long-term strategy  of IRI only in the Fifties,  following an intense political and 
ideological debate on the role and functions of  state-owned companies  in the 
Italian economy
28.  
Therefore the creation of ENI can be considered as an act of strength against 
private interests and, as such, it has been contrasted to that of IRI, an act of 
rescue, in favor of private
29: and this two original imprints – force and weakness - 
would have marked the story of the two holdings
30. ENI primary tasks were to 
furnish low-price energy to the economic system and, as far as the chemical 
sector was concerned, fertilizers and other chemical products to agriculture. Once 
again, then,  as in the Fascist period, but  much more efficaciously, the strategic 
focus was on  the energy independence of the country.  
Actually the institutive law gave ENI  larger freedom of action than it was 
conceded to IRI and transformed it into a major subject of political economy: 
hence for years Mattei (and ENI) would have been the real responsible of the 
energy policy of the country. Besides, by statute ENI was given the monopoly of 
the exploration and production of the Po Valley, a goal pursued by Mattei since 
‘46. For almost a decade this yielded a continuous cash-flow – the so called 
methane rent – which financed the growth of the group
31. 
5.3 – ENI as a group grew highly integrated, on the model of the majors, but 
decision-making was strictly in the hands of Mattei, or at most, of a few  trusty 
collaborators. The internal structure of the group had ENI standing on the top; it 
controlled four parent companies, AGIP Mineraria (upstream), AGIP 
(distribution), SNAM (natural gas and pipelines), ANIC  (refining); these in turn 
controlled a number of companies operating in a range of activities: chemistry, 
engineering, textiles etc. 
Growth in the core business followed a twofold strategy:  
i)  growth on internal market was pursued through an aggressive price strategy 
against the majors. Between 1953 and 1962 the contribution of ENI to Italy’s 
consumption of hydrocarbons grew from 8,5% to more than 20%;  the internal 
yearly production of oil grew from 86 to 513 thousands of tons, the one of 
natural gas from 1.2 to 6.9 billions of cubic meters;  in the same decade 738 wells 
were drilled (equivalent to 2.38 millions meters). In 1962, ENI controlled only 
12% of total refining capacity of the country, which had become the refinery of 
Europe because of her favorable  localization in the middle of the Mediterranean 
                                                  
28 Saraceno 1975; Bottiglieri 1984; Maraffi 1990. 
29 Amato 1976, pp.135-7 
30 Barca, Trento 1997, p.209 
31 Magini 1976, ch.4; Sapelli, Carnevali 1992, pp.40-1.  
  11Sea. But ENI covered 25% of the gasoline market, as a consequence of its price, 
which was the lowest  in Europe and of its aggressive marketing strategy
32;  
ii) the resumption on a larger scale and with better success of the international 
strategy already experimented by Giarratana in the 1930s, mainly in the upstream, 
as soon as exhaustion of internal sources was envisaged. The first move was 
towards a few  LDC (Iran, Egypt, Lybia, Nigeria, Algeria, Argentina, etc.): 
innovative, 75% to 25% contracts of joint-venture with  the hosting states, 
instead of the standard fifty-fifty,  were  offered (the “ENI formula"). From 1959 
to 1962, 12.8 million of tons of crude were produced from these sources. The 
second move was to be even more disruptive of the equilibrium not only of the 
oil-system,  but also of the international policy of containment: the contracts that 
since 1958 were signed with URSS. ENI exchanged cheap soviet crude with 
products of the group. In 1961, 22% of oil imported by Italy came from Russia.
33 
Hence ENI’s “flair for negotiating complex barter deals to gain access to 
crude”
34, mixed with opportunism – just before his death Mattei was negotiating 
an import contract with the most powerful of its enemies, Standard Oil - soon 
gained to the company the reputation of enfant terrible of the international oil 
market. 
A further strategic line  pursued was growth through diversification. 
Increasing diversification into related activities stemmed partly from a conscious 
strategy of growth, partly from ENI’s commitment to foster economic 
development: quite successful initiatives were the entry into Pignone, soon a 
world leader in oil-plants engineering, in the glass sector (SIV), and, at the 
beginning, in basic chemistry (Ravenna)
35. However, the obligation to implement 
public policy goals  became even clearer after the institution of the State Share-
holding Ministry, when a law codified that at least 40% of new investment by 
public holdings should have been addressed toward backward regions. This 
would have had soon perverse effects, such as 1962 ENI’s involvement in textiles 
and the so-called ‘chemical war’
36 . 
5.4 – There is no doubt that ENI was one of the main agents if the Italian 
economic miracle which characterized the passing of the country to a mass 
consumption society. For instance, the construction of a network of highways, 
particularly the Autostrada del Sole, accomplished in a length of time 
unimaginable by today’s standards in Italy, had ENI, together with Fiat and IRI, 
among its main sponsors, whilst AGIP’s action was fundamental to the supply of 
cheap gasoline to the small cars that were beginning to fill  streets and roads
37. 
                                                  
32 Magini 1976, pp.141-5; Kovacs 1966, pp. 191-218; Frankel 1966, p.99 
33 Frankel 1966, pp.138-43; Magini 1976, pp. 145 ff. 
34 Grant 1993, p.291 
35 Roverato 1991; Sapelli, Carnevale 1992, pp.42-8; Grant 1991, pp.246-9. 
36 Such a  war for the control of the market of basic chemicals was fought  against the main private 
competitor, Montedison, and  absorbed huge financial resources for years. See note 48 below. 
37 Menduni 1999; Amatori, Colli 1999, ch.17; Crainz 1996, pp.111-2 
  12Besides its direct impact on growth and employment, ENI had also a strong 
cultural -social influence on the modernization of Italy as it imported and adapted 
several elements of the “American model”: they ranged from the look of its new 
headquarters in Milan and Rome (skyscrapers, open space) and the revolutionary 
service stations in place of the old oil-pumps, to the restructuring of the internal 
organization (supported by US business consultants) and to the introduction of 
consensus strategies. To gain the support of the public and enlarge the one from 
politicians, ENI widely used lobbying and aggressive public relations strategies 
(films and documentaries, elegant annual reports, innovative marketing) all the 
way to create a new, very dynamic newspaper. But ENI had quite an impact also 
at the social level: the introduction of new forms of industrial relations, the 
construction of the residential model-district of Metanopoli, the setting up of  a  
center for the formation of technicians and managers of the oil sector (with 
students coming from the countries to which ENI was linked by business ties), 
the early sponsoring of sport teams, etc.
38 
 
6. ENI from Mattei to the oil crises 
6.1 - The air-crash killed Mattei in a critical moment, when larger and larger 
sections of the political area tried to restrain his action, as for instance in the case 
of the creation of an autonomous SOE for electricity (ENEL), which deluded his 
aspiration for having ENI as the sole depositary of the energy policy of Italy . 
Mattei’s death left the group unsheltered from politics. Moreover, ENI’s 
financial position worsened: traditional short-term loans and self-finance  didn’t 
pay for the ambitious plans of overseas expansion and off-shore exploration, nor 
for the increasing use of ENI as a vehicle of industrial policy. Greater 
diversification and further rescues  (textile, machinery, mining), geographical 
expansion of chemicals (in Sardinia, Sicily, Apulia), the entry in nuclear energy 
and coal mining, all this made for huge costs which ENI alone could not afford 
anymore.  Now direct State aid was necessary, it never happened with Mattei; 
therefore since 1964 the endowment fund began to be inflated: it was 37 billions 
liras in 1953, it grew to 162 in 1964, to 347 in 1968,  to 989 in 1973; later  it more 
or less doubled every five years: 1.871 billions in 1978, 5.234  in 1983, 8.901 in 
1988. This corresponds to an increase in current prices of 241 times in thirty years 
(approximately 38 times in constant prices): it is not difficult to realize how these 
financial necessities could have conditioned the strategic choices of ENI’s top 
management.  
6.2 -  It is usually said that Mattei’s death marked a big change in ENI’s 
strategy: from producer to merchant. As a matter of fact  between 1962 and 1971 
ENI’s purchase of crude strongly increased,  as a consequence of new contracts 
with Standard, Gulf and  URSS: purchases (50.000.000 tons) almost equally direct 
production abroad. In 1965 a contract  with Esso for importing 3 billions of  
                                                  
38 Magini 1976, pp.142 ff.; Perrone  2001, pp. 59-69; Sapelli et al. 1993, pp.199-242 
  13cubic meters of Libyan natural gas was signed. Besides, the  great expansion of 
the pipelines network, connecting Italy to Central Europe, then to URSS and 
Algeria, the construction of refineries in the oil producing countries and the 
merger of AGIP Mineraria, now only a branch, into AGIP (1963) seem to give 
support to such an hypothesis
39.  
Things however  were a little different:  the buy-option had become a 
necessity, at least a temporarily one, as inland oil and gas fields were close to 
exhaustion, while production from new overseas concessions, although 
numerous, was lower than expected. A more successful exploration would have 
required greater investment abroad and in off-shore activities,  the one that ENI 
of president Cefis, already financially over-stretched and engaged in the war for 
the control of the basic chemicals couldn’t afford. At the time this war displaced 
the one for energetic autonomy. 
 
 
                                                
7. ENI through the oil crises. 
7.1 - Unfortunately all this happened on the eve of the first oil-shock, which 
everywhere opened the way to a new run for oil. 
ENI entered the crisis as Italy’s 4
th largest group and world’s 12
th oil company; 
but the most diversified: energy counted for only  65% of its revenue (while 
chemicals counted for 15%, engineering for 8%, textiles for7%). Therefore ENI’s 
activities in the core business just reached 80% of total activities, while in six of 
the seven majors such a share was between 93 and 97%
40. ENI’s strong points 
were plants engineering, thousand of km of pipelines, ability in striking deals, a 
young motivated technical staff and a corporate culture still permeated of Mattei’s 
pioneer spirit, particularly in the operative companies. 
The reaction to the oil crisis was rapid indeed; supplying energy to the country 
became again the primary mission of ENI
41. Hence non-energy investment 
decreased from the 1974-8 yearly average of 32% of total, to 18% (1979-83) and 
12% (1984-6)
42 while upstream investment grew to 1/3 of ENI’s total investment 
in the late ‘70s, and to more than 50% in 1985. ENI’s strategy differed from the 
majors’ one: it invested in upstream also when oil prices fell, and mainly in Africa 
instead of America. Besides ENI developed early off-shore exploration (51% of 
total exploration by 1976)
43. The growing supply of natural gas came mostly from 
purchases, (15.bill. m
c  in 1980, 26 in 1990): only in the late 1980s the yearly 
production grew from  12-14 to 17-18 billion m
c 44. But purchasing gas from 
abroad meant also developing the pipelines system through the ENI’s companies: 
 
39 Magini 1976, pp. 180 ff.; Sapelli, Carnevale 1992, pp.49-69 
40 Grant 1991, pp. 241, 246. 
41 Sapelli et al. 1993, p.83 
42 Grant 1991, tab.12 (p.46), Grant 1993, tab. 2.3 (p .216) 
43 Grant 1991, p. 244; Magini 1976, pp. 210 ff.;  Sapelli, Carnevale 1992, pp. 73-4 
44 Grant 1991, tab.1 (p.252) ; Grant 1993, tab. 2.8 (p.221) 
  14in Italy it grew from 7.600 (1970) to 22.000 km (1990);  large joint-ventures were 
set up for construction and management abroad (TAG, Algeria)
45. 
7.2 - Also the downstream activities of ENI were affected by  the oil shocks 
(and the Suez crisis), following the general repositioning of the sector: 
disintegration, flexibility in supply, divisionalization
46. The exit of Shell, BP, 
Amoco, Texaco from Italian market forced ENI to fill the gap; but also gave the 
group an opportunity to grow in the downstream activities: refining and 
distribution.  ENI took over the downstream activities of Shell Italia (1974) and 
Mach (former BP, 1981) and came to control about 35% of  refining capacity, 
40% of oil products market (50% gasoline).  This required deep continuous 
restructuring: in 1974 a new company, IP, took over Shell activities; in 1978 AGIP 
Petroli was separated from AGIP, to manage  downstream activities; in 1981 AGIP 
Petroli became the parent company of the downstream sector
47. 
Because of the collapse of the OPEC pricing discipline, the ‘80s were a 
decade of crisis and change, but, for ENI, also of growth. ENI, which entered the 
decade as the 8
th biggest oil company, in 1990 was the 5




  However in the early ‘80s financial performance was quite unsatisfactory, 
primarily in the non-energy activities. Therefore a policy of cost-reduction and 
divesting non-core activities (textiles, 1986) was started: since the mid-‘80s 
rationalization deeply affected the refining plants and the gas-stations network. 
Employment which had grown from 76.000 (1971) to the 1983 peak of 144.000, 
was reduced to 106.000 in 1989
49. 
Only the chemical question was not solved
50: ENI in the early ‘90s would 
have been involved in a new battle which practically ended up in the liquidation 
of the basic chemical in Italy . 
                                                  
45 Sapelli, Carnevale, 1992, pp. 77-80, Grant 1993, p. 222 
46 Mabro, Bacon, 1990; Grant 1991, pp.17-68; Grant 1993; pp. 25-81, Sapelli et al. 1993, pp. 81-7, 94-7 
47 Sapelli et al. 1993, chs. 3 and 4. 
48 Grant 1993, tab. 2.1 (p.39) 
49 Sapelli et al. 1993, ch. 5; Sapelli, Carnevale 1992, pp. 86-98; Barca, Trento 1996, tab. 1(pp. 198-9) 
50 The story of the struggle for the control of the chemical industry between  ENI, which earlier had 
already diversified into basic chemicals, and Montecatini-Edison, the main private concern which 
controlled one fifth of the European market of plastics, is rather complicate and cannot easily 
summarized here. It exploded in 1968  when, in the attempt at rationalizing the entire sector , the 
president of ENI, Cefis, supported by  Mediobanca, a powerful merchant bank, tried to gain control 
over the private company, which was in a very bad financial condition. However the ambiguous actual 
outcome of the move – a mixed private-public syndicate of control – , the resistance of other private 
chemical companies, plus contrasting political interests hampered the restructuring. In the early ‘80s the 
company, now Montedison, was remitted  into private hands to become for a while a public company, 
until (1986) it came under the control of an unscrupulous raider, Roul Gardini, the president of 
Ferruzzi, a major holding in the food industry. The raid cost an enormous financial effort which forced 
Gardini to search for a new agreement with ENI: the result was Enimont, a new company to which the 
basic chemical activities of both groups were conferred. After Gardini’s failed attempt to gain the 
majority of the new company, Ferruzzi’s share in Enimont, greatly overvalued to hide the enormous 
quota paid to the ruling political parties, was sold to ENI. The financial/political scandal that followed, 
tragically marked by the suicide of the two main characters of the story, ended up in the de facto 
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8. Concluding remarks. 
Deep changes in the oil market in the 1970s and 1980s could not but greatly 
affect ENI’s policy. By the mid-80s it was clear that the mission and the goals 
assigned to SOES in the mid-fifties could not be fulfilled anymore, at least along 
the lines previously followed. ENI had to confront with competitiveness and 
growth according to the market rule: strategies finalized to profitability and 
efficiency became more and more important vis a vis  the economic and social 
objectives. By the early 1980s the state-company had in facts definitively  entered 
the elite of oil world market: estimated reserves of oil and gas liquids amounted in 
1990 to 2.881 millions barrels (3.782 in 2001) with an increase since 1985 of  
34%: this value was bigger than the ones of Texaco, Amoco, Elf and could bear 
comparison with Chevron, Mobil, BP
51.  
Differently from the previous years, since the mid-90s ENI is making huge 
profits: this has opened the way to a smooth process of de-nationalization. As a 
matter of fact the large number of shareholders who subscribed the three public 
auctions which privatized the 70% of the former public holding, have been 
already nicely rewarded. 
These quite satisfactory results seem to be the rip of a  fifty years accumulation 
of capabilities and technicalities strictly connected with its previous missions. 
However a balanced evaluation of the contribution of the holding to the growth 
of the country is hard to trace: we should need very sophisticated cost-benefit 
analysis. But  the intuitive answer to a  simple counterfactual question – whether 














                                                                                                                                                   
liquidation of the chemical industry of Italy. The valuable fine chemical activities of Ferruzzi were sold 
to Shell, while in the mid Nineties ENI started to sell its inflated  basic chemical activities mostly to 
foreign buyers. See, e.g., Scalfari-Turani 1974; Marchi-Marchionatti 1992; Barca-Trento 1996; Amatori-
Colli 1999.  
51 Grant 1993, various tables 
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 millions  index  bill.x  000 
1985 liras 




1860 21,8  100  52,3 100 1,9 100 36,9  100 9
1870 25,8  125  57,0 110 2,5 130 42,9  120 30
 1880  28,2  136  63,5 120 3,0 200 47,6  129 44
1890 30,5  146  65,8 130 5,0 330 76,3  207 66
1900 32,4  157  76,0 150 5,6 370 73,7  200 67
1910 34,5  169  91,8 180 9,9 660 108,1  293 72
1920 36,0  165  108,9 210 9,1 610 83,9  227 50
1930 41,1  189  129,0 250 18,0 1.200 139,0  377 62
1940 44,9  206  156,5 300 21,7 1.450 138,7  376 52
1950 46,9  215  173,3 330 21,5 1.430 124,3  337 54
1960 49,8  228  303,4 580 48,2 3.210 158,9  431 58
1965 51,5  236  387,4 740 80,1 5.340 206,7  560 74
1970 53,3  244  522,5 990 120,1 8.010 229,8  623 80
1973 54,7  251  585,5 1.120 139,8 9.320 238,9  648 82
1975 55,5  255  601,3 1.150 133,0 8.870 221,1  599 81
1980 56,0  257  756,2 1.450 147,0 9.800 194,4  527 83
1985 57,9  266  810,6 1.560 146,2 9.750 180,4  489 81
1990 58,0  266  941,4 1.800 163,5 10.900 173,7  471 83
 
































1865 81,4 10,2  < 1 8,2  0,0 100
1870 82,8 9,8  < 1 6,8 0,0 100
1880 74,5 17,3  < 1 7,3 0,0 100
1890 56,5 35,3  < 1 7,5 0,0 100
1900 51,2 39,8  < 1 8,2 0,0 100
1910 33,3 54,5  < 1 11,3 0,0 100
1920  16,5 51,1 4,6 0,1 4,7 27,8 0,0 100
1930  11,6 54,7 7,9 0,0 7,9 25,3 0,0 100
1940  7,1 51,0 8,8 0,1 8,9 32,5 0,0 100
1950 6,9 33,3  22,1 2,0 24,1 35,5  0,0 100
1960 2,5 16,5  44,0 11,0 55,0 26,0  0,0 100
1965 0,0 13,1  65,3 8,0 73,3 12,5  1,0 100
1970 0,0 9,2  72,6 8,9 81,5 8,1  0,6 100
1973 0,0 7,3  75,3 10,2 85,5 6,5  0,5 100
1975 0,0 7,4  70,4 13,8 84,2 7,4  0,6 100
1980 0,0 8,5  67,2 15,5 82,7 7,5  0,3 100
1985 0,0 11,1  58,6 18,7 77,3 7,1  1,0 100
1990 0,0 9,7  56,6 23,9 80,5 5,1  0,0 100
 
N.B.: The 1865-1910 data are referred to supply of energy, the following to consumption. 
 
Sources: 1865: Bardini, 1991 : tab.5;     
     1870-1910: Bardini, 1998: tab.3;     
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1900  69 0 0 31  0 100  31
1910  83 0 0 17  0 100  17
1920  96 0 0 4  0 100 4
1930  97 1 0 2  0 100 2
1940  92 3 0 5  0 100 5
1950  88 5 0 4 2 1 100 6
1960  82 4 0 4 7 4 100  10
1965  52 3 4 5 33 3 100  37
1970  35 2 3 6 49 5 100  58
1973  27 2 2 4 62 3 100  67
1975  29 1 3 5 57 5 100  64
1980  26 1 1 10 57 5 100  70
1985  24 1 4 16 41 13 100  72
1990  16 2 0 17 47 18 100  81
* it comprises also direct purchases of electricity from abroad 
 







Table 4. ENI 1953-1990 : some economic indicators 
 





millions of   
barrels 
b 
Natural gas    









bill. constant £ 
e 
1953             86  n.a 1.2   16.000        2,00
1962    4.200  n.a 6.9 56.000   0,69
1969   8.200  n.a 11.0 63.000   6,64
1972  11.700  n.a 12.3   79.000   11,57
1975  14.900  n.a 14.6 100.000   10,44
1980     17.300     <2.000 13.8 123.000 18,76
1985  14.300      2.149 13.9 129.000 60,63
1990  17.800      2.881 17.7 106.000 61,40
 
Sources: col.a:  
               col. b,c:  Grant 1991, p.252, tab.1, , Grant 1993, pp. 220-1, tab. 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8 
               Col d,e:  Barca -Trento 1996, pp.198-9, tab.1 
 
 